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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Civil Procedure - Res Judicata Effect of Dismissal With Prejudice
Garrett v. Corry Foam Products, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 808
(Tenn. 1980).
Plaintiff brought an action against his employer under the
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Statute,' seeking compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Defendant, asserting the defense of res judicata, moved
for summary judgment.' Affidavits and exhibits filed with the
motion showed that plaintiff had sued defendant previously on
the same cause of action.' The previous suit had been dismissed
with prejudice by a consent order signed by the parties' attorneys.4 The trial court dismissed the action. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Tennessee,' held, reversed and remanded.
The words "with prejudice" in an order of dismissal by consent
are ineffective to transform the dismissal into a judgment on the
1.
TENN. CODE ANN. §1 50-901 to -1029 (Supp. 1980). The phrase "workman's compensation" was changed to "workers' compensation" by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1980. Act of March 11, 1980, ch. 534, 1980 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 121.
2. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56. In order to grant the motion the trial court had to
find that there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that defendant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03.
3. Submitted with the motion were the affidavit of the clerk of the court
and the pleadings and orders in the previous action. There was no mention or
evidence of settlement or release. Garrett v. Corry Foam Prods., Inc., 596 S.W.
2d 808, 809 (Tenn. 1980).
4. The order was not signed by either of the parties. Id. at 808.
5. Appeal in workers' compensation cases is direct from the trial court to
the supreme court. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1018 (1977).
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merits which will bar a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. Garrett v. Corry Foam Products, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1980).
One purpose of a system of civil procedure is to strike a balance between the interest in attaining a just resolution of conflicts and the interest in achieving an end to litigation.* The doctrine of res judicata is an attempt to ensure both justice and
finality for the parties to a suit. Under this doctrine, a final
judgment on the merits in a previous suit will preclude a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.7 When the previous judgment is unfavorable to the plaintiff, the judgment is a bar to the plaintiff's maintenance of the
subsequent suit.5 Finality is achieved by the preclusion of another suit while justice is protected by the requirement that the
previous judgment must have been on the merits.' In deciding
whether to sustain a defense of res judicata in a particular case,
the court must determine whether the previous judgment was on
the merits.10 Difficulty arises when the former suit was terminated at some point prior to a trial or a hearing on the facts and
issues.' 1 At issue in Garrett was the effect of a consent order of
dismissal which, by use of the words "with prejudice," purported
to bar a subsequent suit."2 The court had to decide whether the
judgment was a bar under the doctrine of res judicata.
It is not clear when dismissals with prejudice came into
6. Moulton v. Ford Motor Co., 533 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1976).
7. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
8. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942).
9. The United States Supreme Court has held that "there must be at
least one decision on a right between the parties before there can be said to be
a termination of the controversy, and before a judgment can avail as a bar to a
subsequent suit." Haldeman v. United States, 91 U.S. 584, 585 (1875).
10. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments suggests that the phrase
"on the merits" is not a test but a conclusion; that is, the phrase is merely

descriptive of a judgment which will operate as a bar. RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 48, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

(SECOND)

11. 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 836 (1952).
12. Other issues discussed by the court but not critical to the holding
were the special statutory requirements for judgments in workers' compensation cases and the fact that the parties themselves did not sign the order of
dismissal. 596 S.W.2d at 810-11. See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
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use;'5 the dismissal probably originated as the converse in law to
the dismissal without prejudice in equity. 4 While a dismissal

13. At common law there was no dismissal in actions at law. An action
could be terminated in the defendant's favor by a verdict, by the sustaining of
a demurrer, or by a discontinuance, nonsuit, non prosequitur, nolle prosequi,

or retraxit. Bond v. McNider, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 440 (1843). A discontinuance,
nonsuit, or non prosequiturresulted from merely procedural defects in the action and did not bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARms

*296; 1 E. COKE,

INSTITUTES

(pt. 1)

ed. London 1794) (1st ed. n.p. n.d.); 2 W. ToD, THE PRACTICE

*139.a. (15th

OF THE COURT OF

KING'S BENCH 867-68 (3d Am. ed. Philadelphia 1840) (9th ed. London 1828). A

nolle prosequi resulted from defects in the substance of the action, either as to
one defendant or one issue, while a retraxit involved a defect in the substance
of the action as a whole. Both a nolle prosequi and a retraxit were ordinarily
bars to subsequent actions. 1 W. TIDn, supra, at 681-83; Beecher's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 559 (K.B. 1608); 4 G. JACOB, THE LAw-DICTIONARY 397 (Ist Am. ed.
New York & Philadelphia 1811); 5 G. JAcoB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY 523 (Ist
Am. ed. New York & Philadelphia 1811). The dismissal originated in equity.
See Lloyd v. Powis, 1 Dickens 16 (Ch. 1671). A bill could be dismissed for lack
of prosecution or because "the plaintiff had no title to the relief sought by his
bill." J. MITIORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF
CHANCERY 196 (2d ed. Dublin 1795) (1st ed. n.p. n.d.). Dismissal for the latter
reason was, like the notle prosequi and retraxit at law, a bar to a subsequent
suit on the same cause of action; a dismissal for lack of prosecution, however,
like a discontinuance, nonsuit, or non prosequitur at law, was not a bar to a
subsequent suit. Id. In accordance with his extraordinary powers as the keeper
of the King's conscience, 1 J. POMzROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 33-35 (5th ed. San Francisco 1941), the Chancellor had a power which the
law judges did not: the power to provide that a dismissal of a bill based on the
determination that the plaintiff had no right to relief would not be a bar to a
subsequent suit, J. MrrFoar, supra, at 196. The Chancellor exercised this
power by dismissing the bill without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to maintain a subsequent action. Id. The separate systems of law and equity with their
attendant procedures became part of the law of Tennessee. J.W. Kelly & Co. v.
Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 360, 123 S.W. 622, 627 (1909). Gradually, many of the
common-law procedural rules were modified by statutory and case law. See,
e.g., B.E. Dodd & Son v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 120 Tenn. 440, 110 S.W.
588 (1908); Littlejohn v. Fowler, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 284, 288 (1868); Armstrong
v. Harrison, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 379 (1858); Graham v. Cook, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.)
404 (1834); Johnston v. Ditty & Smith, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 85 (1834).
14. "This term ['with prejudice'] has a well-recognized legal import; it is
the converse of the term 'without prejudice' and is conclusive of the rights of
the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final adjudication adverse to
the plaintiff." Union Indem. Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. 752,
761, 18 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1929). The fusion between courts of law and equity in
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without prejudice entered by the Chancellor provided that an
adjudication on the merits would not bar a subsequent suit, a
dismissal with prejudice entered by the law judge provided that
an adjudication not on the merits would bar a subsequent suit.
Originally, therefore, the emphasis was upon the involuntary nature of a dismissal with prejudice. Gradually, dismissal with
prejudice came to be used in both voluntary and consent dismissals; such dismissals were identified with the retraxit, a procedure in actions at law by which the plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his cause of action." A retraxit was the plaintiff's
"voluntary acknowledgment that he [had] no cause of action"t'
It was "an open and voluntary renunciation of his suit in
court."' 7 By a retraxit the plaintiff did more than admit he had
not produced enough evidence to support his cause of action, as
in a nonsuit: he admitted that he had no cause of action at all."
Therefore, a retraxit was an absolute bar to a subsequent suit on
the same cause of action" and could not be entered by the
plaintiff's attorney but only by the plaintiff himself in open

many states eliminated the distinctions between their respective procedures.
Even in Tennessee there was some confusion about the proper court for the
application of each set of rules. See B.E. Dodd & Son v. Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry., 120 Tenn. 440, 110 S.W. 588 (1908) (court of law has no power to enter
dismissal without prejudice); Ford v. Bartlett, 62 Tenn. (3 Bax.) 20 (1873) (discontinuance applies only in courts of law, not in courts of equity).
15. Kronkright v. Gardner, 31 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219, 107 Cal. Rptr. 270,
273 (1973) (dismissal of an action with prejudice is a retraxit); Robinson v.
Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 666, 672, 260 P.2d 194, 197 (1953) (a dismissal with
prejudice is "the modern name for a retraxit"); Steele v. Beaty, 215 N.C. 680, 2
S.E.2d 854 (1939) (plaintiff's statement in open court agreeing to a dismissal is
a retraxit); Virginia Concrete Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Va. 821, 826-27,
91 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1956) (consent dismissal with prejudice has the effect of a
retraxit).
16. Beecher's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 563.
17. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296.
18. "At common law a retraxit differed from a voluntary withdrawal by
the plaintiff of his action, in that a retraxit terminated both the action and the
right of action, while such a withdrawal terminated the action only, leaving in
the plaintiff the right to recommence his suit upon the same alleged right"
Harvey v. Boyd, 24 Ga. App. 561, 561, 101 S.E. 708, 708 (1919) (Luke, J.; syllabus by the court).
19. 1 E. COKE, supra note 13, at * 139.a; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*296.
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court.20 The retraxit also was equated with consent dismissals
which were not expressly with prejudice. 1 Since both the retraxit and an adjudication on the merits had the same effect-to
bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action-the same
dismissal which was seen as a retraxit in some states was seen as
an adjudication on the merits in other states.2 '
In Lindsay v. Allen's the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected

the equation of a dismissal by consent with the retraxit.'4 Defendant demurred to a bill filed "to enjoin the removal of the
county seat of Campbell County from Jacksboro to LaFollette""15

on the ground that an earlier suit for the same purpose filed by
another group of citizens had been dismissed. In reversing the
Chancellor's dismissal of the bill on this ground, the court construed the prior dismissal as a consent decree by which plaintiffs

dismissed the action in consideration of the payment of costs by
20. Beecher's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 559.
21. E.g., Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 171, 118
S.E. 502, 505 (1923); Hoover v. Mitchell, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 387, 388 (1874);
Pethtel v. McCullough, 49 W. Va. 520, 522, 39 S.E. 199, 200 (1901).
22. In some states dismissals by consent have been treated as adjudications on the merits. See Root v. Topeka Water Supply Co., 46 Kan. 183, 18687, 26 P. 398, 399 (1890); Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 32 Ky. (2
Dana) 395, 395 (1834). In other states the words "with prejudice" are sufficient

to make the dismissal an adjudication on the merits. E.g., DeGraff v. Smith, 62
Ariz. 261, 269, 157 P.2d 342, 345 (1945); Harris v.Moye's Estate, 211 Ark. 765,
767-68, 202 S.W.2d 360, 362 (1947); In re Estate of Crane, 343 Ill. App. 327,
344-46, 99 N.E.2d 204, 212-13 (1951); Pulley v. Chicago, Rock I. & Pac. Ry.,
122 Kan. 269, 270, 251 P. 1100, 1101 (1927); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp.,
17 N.J. Super. 505, 511, 86 A.2d 293, 296 (Chan. Div. 1952). In other cases
there is an implication that a dismissal with prejudice is considered an adjudication on the merits only where there is evidence of a compromise settlement.
See, e.g., Mensing v. Sturgeon, 250 Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959); Denny v.
Mathieu, 452 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1970); Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961).
At least one state has incorporated the dismissal with prejudice into its rules of
civil procedure, providing that such a dismissal "bars the assertion of the same
cause of action or claim against the same party." Mo. R.Civ. P. 67.03.
23. 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171 (1904).
24. The court's rejection of retraxitwas stated in broad terms: "We have
no case in this State applying the rule of 'retraxit,' and we shall not now adopt
it." Id. at 654, 82 S.W. at 174. The court's definition of the term, however,
clearly limited it to dismissals by consent. Id. at 653, 82 S.W. at 173.
25. Id. at 644, 82 S.W. at 171.
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defendant." The court noted that a consent decree is binding
upon the parties to it and cannot be appealed,27 but rejected the
proposition that "the mere dismissal of a cause by consent of
parties will bar a future action.""' Although the question in
Lindsay was one of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata,"'
the court quoted with approval from one of the landmark res
judicata cases, Haldeman v. United States:30
There must have been a right adjudicated or released in the
first suit to make it a bar, and this fact must appear affirmatively ....

Suits are often dismissed by the parties, and a gen-

eral entry is made to that effect, without incorporating in the
record, or even placing on file the agreement. It may settle
nothing, or it may settle the entire dispute. If the latter, there
must be a proper statement to that effect to render it available
as a bar. But the general entry of the dismissal of a suit by
agreement

. . .

is a withdrawal of a suit on terms, which may

be more or less important. They may refer to costs, or they
may embrace a full settlement of the contested points; but, if
they are sufficient to bar the plaintiff, the plea must show it."

Thus, the court in Lindsay indicated that a consent decree will
be given res judicata effect only when it appears that the prior
suit was dismissed pursuant to a settlement or adjustment of
rights between the parties."
26. Id. at 650, 82 S.W. at 173. The court did not have the prior decree
before it and thus construed it alternatively as a voluntary dismissal and as a
dismissal by consent, reaching the same result under both constructions.
27. The court cited numerous cases involving consent decrees. Id. at 654,
82 S.W. at 174.
28. Id. at 655, 82 S.W. at 174.
29. Since the second suit did not involve the same parties, the question
was whether the previous dismissal would bar the subsequent suit by different
plaintiffs. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 86, 93 (1942) (discussing persons
bound by a prior adjudication).
30. 91 U.S. 584 (1875).
31. Id. at 586, quoted in Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 652-53, 82 S.W.
171, 174 (1904).
32. This principle was followed in Third Nat'l Bank v. Scribner, 212
Tenn. 400, 370 S.W.2d 482 (1963), in which the court adopted the general rule
that consent judgments have the same res judicata effect as judgments rendered after a trial or hearing on the merits. The court held that an order of
dismissal by consent which recited that the parties "have compromised and
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The effect of a consent dismissal with prejudice was first
considered by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Long v.KirbySmith." As a result of a three-vehicle accident, plaintiffs
brought a personal injury action against three defendants. They
entered into a covenant not to sue 4 with two of the defendants.
Pursuant to this agreement a consent order s was entered dismissing the action against the two defendants "with full
prejudice.""6 A jury verdict was rendered against the third defendant, who appealed on the ground that the dismissal "with
full prejudice" was an adjudication on the merits barring any
37
further suit on the same cause of action.
The court of appeals first determined that the words "with
full prejudice" did not make the dismissal a bar; the words were
"in themselves ambiguous and uncertain."" In order to ascertain the meaning of the words, the court looked to the covenant
not to sue5 ' and held that the words "with full prejudice" meant
"with the full prejudice provided for in plaintiffs' covenant not
to sue."40 Because the covenant provided that plaintiffs could
sue the two defendants again, with defendants allowed to plead
the covenant as a "set off or Recoupment,"' 1 the court held that
the order of dismissal was not a bar to the suit against the third
defendant. In its holding the court emphasized the consensual

settled all the matters in controversy and evidenced same by a written agreement," id. at 404, 370 S.W.2d at 484, was an adjudication on the merits and
thus a bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of
action, id. at 410, 370 S.W.2d at 487.
33. 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216 (1956).
34. The parties agreed that the document was a covenant not to sue and
not a release. Id. at 450-51, 292 S.W.2d at 218.
35. Each plaintiff entered such an order, each identical except for the
plaintiff's name. The court quoted from only one. Id. at 451, 292 S.W.2d at
218.
36. The parties themselves did not sign the orders. Id. at 451, 292 S.W.2d
at 218.
37. Id. at 452, 292 S.W.2d at 219.

38.
39.
with the
455, 292
40.
41.

Id. at 454, 292 S.W.2d at 220.
"So we think these orders of dismissal must be read and construed
covenant not to sue, on which such orders were based .....
Id. at
S.W.2d at 220.
Id., 292 S.W.2d at 220.
Id., 292 S.W.2d at 220.
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nature of the dismissal. In accordance with the principle set out
in Lindsay,4 the court looked to the substance of the parties'
agreement to determine what was settled by the dismissal.
The court, however, offered a second reason why the order

could not be a bar to the action against the third defendant:
"[Tlhe Trial Court had no jurisdiction to enter such a decree." 4 '
In a misleading discussion of the history of dismissals with and
without prejudice, the court noted that the power to dismiss
with or without prejudice originally was the Chancellor's alone."
The court reasoned that since Tennessee has retained separate
courts of law and equity the powers of a law judge in Tennessee
do not include the powers of the Chancellor; therefore, the judge

of a law court has no power to enter a dismissal with prejudice."
Although this conclusion would have been apposite to an involuntary dismissal with prejudice, it fails to explain adequately

why the parties could not effectively agree to make the judgment
a bar by use of the words "with prejudice." The court, relying on
Lindsay, apparently reasoned that the parties were attempting a
retraxit and that the dismissal was ineffective as a bar since retraxit is not recognized in Tennessee." By failing to note the

42. See notes 23-32 supra and accompanying text.
43. 40 Tenn. App. at 456, 292 S.W.2d at 220.
44. The court accepted the modern misapprehension that a dismissal of a
bill in equity that was not without prejudice was automatically with prejudice
and a bar to a subsequent suit. Id., 292 S.W.2d at 220. This is misleading. The
sources unanimously state that in order to plead a prior adjudication in bar of
an action, the defendant had to show that the previous suit was determined
after a hearing on the merits. A prior judgment on the merits that was without
prejudice could not be pleaded in bar. If there had been a converse exception-if a dismissal with prejudice could be pleaded in bar-the sources certainly would so state, and they do not. J. MrrroR, supra note 13, at 196; G.
COOPER, A TREATISE OP PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE HIGH COURT

OP

270 (New York 1813); F. VAN HRYTHUYSEN, THE EQUITY DRArsmaN
431-32 (1st Am. ed. New York 1819); 1 J. SMrrTH, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE
OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 221-22 (2d Am. ed. Philadelphia 1842) (let ed.
London 1835). Moreover, since the role of the Chancellor was to ameliorate the
harshness resulting from the strict application of legal rules, it would be anomalous if his discretion, the tool by which such relief was afforded, could be used
to achieve a result even harsher than that reached by the application of legal
rules.
45. 40 Tenn. App. at 456-58, 292 S.W.2d at 221-22.
46. Id. at 456, 292 S.W.2d at 221.
CHANCERY
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narrow definition of retraxit in Lindsay, the court broadened
the rejection of retraxit to encompass dismissals with prejudice.
In determining whether an order of dismissal operates as res
judicata, the court said, "The decisive test is whether the judgment of dismissal was on the merits . . . . "" Since the court
found that the dismissal was not on the merits, the words "with
full prejudice" were "disregarded as surplusage.""'
The Long decision set Tennessee apart from other jurisdictions in several important respects. First, the court in Long
clearly held that the phrase "with prejudice" has no "well-recognized legal import'" in Tennessee: the words are to be construed in light of the order itself and any agreement upon which
it is based. Second, by its misplaced reliance on Lindsay, the
court broadened the rejection of retraxit to include not only dismissals by consent but also dismissals with prejudice. Third, by
requiring that to be a bar the dismissal must have been on the
merits, the court did explicitly in its second line of reasoning
what it had done implicitly in its first line of reasoning. The
court accepted the principle of res judicata approved in Lindsay:
no matter what the form of the dismissal or the phrases used in
it, the court will determine its res judicata effect on the basis of
a showing of what the dismissal in fact settled." The plaintiff's
right to an adjudication on the merits cannot be defeated.
In another case involving the effect of a dismissal with
prejudice, Patrick v. Dickson,51 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
used Long as a touchstone in holding that the dismissal with
prejudice of a paternity action in juvenile court for failure to
prosecute" was not a bar to a subsequent paternity suit between
the same parties. The words "with prejudice" were "a nullity"

47. 40 Tenn. App. at 458, 292 S.W.2d at 221.
48. Id., 292 S.W.2d at 222. ,
49. Union Indem. Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. 752, 761,
18 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1929).
50. See Haldeman v. United States, 91 U.S. 584, 586 (1875), quoted with
approval in Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 652-53, 82 S.W. 171, 174 (1904).

51. 526 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1975).
52. Although the order did not state the reason for the dismissal, in light
of plaintiff's failure to appear for trial, the supreme court treated the dismissal
as one for failure to prosecute. Id. at 450.
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because the dismissal was not on the merits.'8 Although the
court thus affirmed the basic principle set out in Long, it noted a
significant new element present in Patrick: the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure. After quoting the Long court's determination
that law judges have no power to dismiss cases with or without
prejudice, the court went on to say, "The present practice is governed by Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but,
as aforesaid, these rules do not apply to the juvenile court. That
court continues to be governed by the common law rules of Long
"54

Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective January 1, 1971,"1 governs dismissal of actions.5 Incorporated into Rule 41 is the juxtaposition of the dis53. Id. at 453. Whether the dismissal was on the merits was important
for another reason: pursuant to THNN. CODE ANN. § 28-106 (1955) (current
version at TENN. CoDE ANN. § 28-1-105 (1980)), plaintiff had the right to bring
a second action within one year of the dismissal of the first if the dismissal was
not on a ground "concluding (her] right of action." Id.
54. 526 S.W.2d at 453.
55. TENN. R. Civ. P. I (compiler's notes 1977) (stating effective date of
the Rules).
56. Rule 41 provides:
41.01. Voluntary dismissal-Effect thereof. - (1) Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23.03 or Rule 66 and of any statute, and except
when a motion for summary judgment made by an adverse party is
pending, the plaintiff shall have the right to take a voluntary nonsuit
or to dismiss an action without prejudice by filing a written notice of
dismissal at any time before the trial of a cause; or by an oral notice of
dismissal made in open court during the trial of a cause; or in jury
trials at any time before the jury retires to consider its verdict and
prior to the ruling of the court sustaining a motion for a directed
verdict ...
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has twice dismissed in any court an action
based on or included [sic] the same claim.
41.02. Involuntary dismissal - Effect thereof. - (1) For failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him. ...
(3) Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this Rule 41, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
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missal without prejudice"7 and the dismissal which operates as
"an adjudication on the merits."" This juxtaposition suggests
acceptance of the equation between dismissals with prejudice
and dismissals which are adjudications on the merits by indicating that adjudication on the merits, like with prejudice, is the
opposite of without prejudice.0" This concept is incompatible

with Lonr 0 and Patrick," both of which indicated that in Tennessee the phrase "with prejudice" is not equivalent to "on the
merits." Nevertheless, following the reasoning of the court in

Patrick, the effect of the dismissal of an action in a court in
which the Rules of Civil Procedure apply" would be determined
by Rule 41.
Another development related to the res judicata effect of
dismissals was the abandonment in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments of the requirement that to be a bar the former

adjudication must have been on the merits." The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments notes that the interest in finality may
require that the former judgment be a bar "even though the
substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff
has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remeimproper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
57. TENN. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1).
58. TENN. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2) and 41.02(3).
59. A dismissal not without prejudice is equivalent to a dismissal with
prejudice. A dismissal not without prejudice is also equivalent to an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of an
adjudication on the merits.
60. See notes 33-50 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
62. The Rules apply to procedure in the circuit and chancery courts and
courts of like jurisdiction. TENN. R. Civ. P. 1.
63. Compare REsATEMENr (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973): "A valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim," with RESTATEMENT OF JUDoMENTS 1 48 (1942): "Where a valid and final personal judgment is rendered on the merits in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot
thereafter maintain an action on the original cause of action." (emphasis
added). In Tennessee the courts have held consistently that to constitute a bar
to a subsequent suit, a prior adjudication must have been on the merits. Hurst
v. Means, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 546, 547 (1856); First Nat'l Bank v. Ivie, 41
Tenn. App. 187, 197, 293 S.W.2d 34, 38 (1955) and cases cited therein.
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dies in the first proceeding."" A prior dismissal, therefore, can
bar a subsequent suit. Even if a subsequent suit is barred, however, the interest in justice receives considerable protection from
the more liberal pleading and amendment provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules."
In Garrett v. Corry Foam Products, Inc.6 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee faced squarely the problem of determining
the effect of a dismissal with prejudice. The court's rationale indicated that common-law rules of procedure and traditional notions of res judicata still play a role in the determination of procedural questions. There were two ways in which the court could
have found that the prior dismissal constituted a bar to the subsequent action. First, the court could have focused on the order
of dismissal itself and could have considered both its consensual
nature and its use of the phrase "with prejudice." Quoting extensively from Long, the court affirmed that retraxit is not recognized in Tennessee; 67 therefore, the dismissal could not automatically be equated with a retraxit so as to bar a subsequent
suit. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether the court realized
that it had rejected retraxit as the equivalent of both a consent
dismissal and a dismissal with prejudice. Since the order itself
provided no evidence that there had been any settlement or adjustment of rights between the parties," under traditional notions of res judicata the order did not constitute a judgment on
the merits. Clearly, therefore, the court followed Long in eschewing the determination of res judicata solely on the basis of
the form of the dismissal or its use of the meaningless phrase
"with prejudice."
Second, the court could have looked beyond the order itself
to the entire record in the previous suit. The court did in fact

64.

RESTATEMNrr (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENrS § 48, Comment a (Tent. Draft

No. 1, 1973).
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or JuDo~mrrs
Comment d, 43 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

66.

§ 48, Reporter's Note to

596 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1980).

67. Id. at 810.
68. The only phrase that conceivably could have been interpreted as evidence of an agreement or settlement was "for reasons satisfactory to the

Court," which the supreme court evidently found to be too vague and ambiguous to indicate a settlement. Id. at 809.
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peruse the entire record,"u but apparently found no evidence of

an agreement with which to construe the phrase "with
prejudice," as the court in Long had done. The court found that
the previous judgment "was not a determination of the plaintiff's right of action on the merits, unless the words 'with
prejudice' can be held to have had that effect."" Thus, in
neither the order of dismissal itself nor in the record of the previous suit did the court find evidence of an adjudication on the

merits.
The court did not attempt to harmonize its decision with
Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure;"' the court
simply stated that "nothing in either the text of that rule or in
the committee comments thereto changes the law hereinabove
discussed, i.e., that retraxits are not recognized in Tennessee. ' ",
In fact, Rule 41 does not encompass the situation in Garrett: a
dismissal by consent which purported to operate as an adjudication on the merits.'3 Therefore, Garrett exemplifies one situation
in which the Rules of Civil Procedure will have to be supplemented by common-law procedural rules.
Even more significant was the court's implicit rejection of
the less stringent standard for res judicata espoused by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.' 4 The court did not ask
whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate the matter
fully in the first action; rather, the court asked whether the is69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See note 56 supra.
72. 596 S.W.2d at 810.
73. Rule 41.01 contemplates a situation in which the plaintiff voluntarily
and unilaterally dismisses his action. The rule generally provides that such a
dismissal will be without prejudice and prescribes the one situation in which a
dismissal will be an adjudication on the merits. "TENN.R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). Rule
41.02 contemplates a situation in which the judge, either on motion of the defendant or upon a determination under another rule, dismisses the plaintiff's
action. The rule provides generally that such a dismissal will operate as an
adjudication on the merits except that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an indispensable party are not adjudications on the
merits. TENN. R. Civ. P. 41.02(3). No provision of Rule 41 deals with the situa-

tion in Garrett, in which both parties agreed to the dismissal and as part of
their agreement attempted to decide its res judicata effect.
74. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
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sues had in fact been determined in the prior suit. In Garrett
the court made clear that the standard of res judicata which will
be applied when the prior suit was dismissed by consent is the
traditional standard 7' approved in Lindsay: "There must have
been a right adjudicated or released in the first76 suit to make it a
bar, and this fact must appear affirmatively.1

Unfortunately, the court discussed two issues which might
appear to narrow the holding but which in fact should not. First,
the court declared that "an additional reason" for its holding
was the fact that the dismissal order was signed only by the parties' attorneys and not by the parties themselves.7 7 The issue
was not whether the absence of the parties' signatures implied
their lack of consent to the dismissal; rather, the question discussed by the court was whether the absence of the parties' signatures was determinative of the res judicata effect of the dismissal. Since the retraxit is not recognized in Tennessee, the
order could not have been a retraxit even if signed by the parties. The absence of the parties' signatures was not determinative because, under the court's analysis, the order of dismissal
would have had no greater power with the parties' signatures
than it had without them. Because it was not an adjudication on
the merits, the prior dismissal in Garrett would not have barred
the subsequent suit even if the order had been signed by the
parties.
The second issue addressed by the court was the particular
statutory requirements for settlements in workers' compensation
cases. 78 Noting that the order of dismissal did not contain a
75. 596 S.W.2d at 809. "A party who asserts the defense of res judicata
or estoppel by judgment has the burden of proving it and must show that the
right in question was determined on the merits in the former judgment." Id.
(citations omitted).
76. Haldeman v. United States, 91 U.S. 584, 586 (1875), quoted in Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 652-53, 82 S.W. 171, 174 (1904).
77.

596 S.W.2d at 810.

78. Id. at 811. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1006 (Supp. 1980) provides:
Settlement between parties to be approved by courtCosts-Parties.-The interested parties shall have the right to settle
all matters of compensation between themselves, but all settlements,
before the same are binding on either party, shall be reduced to writing and shall be approved by the judge of the circuit court or of the
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finding by the trial judge that the settlement was in the employee's best interest, the court said that the order "for this reason, too, is invalid as a judgment on the merits.""' The court's
emphasis on the principles of Long made clear that it rejected
this more narrow basis for its holding in favor of a broader holding applicable not just to workers' compensation cases. If the order of dismissal had contained a finding that the "settlement
[was].

.

. for the best interest of the employee," 0 there necessa-

rily would have been evidence of the settlement, and the court,
therefore, would have found that the dismissal was on the merits. The requirement that to be a bar the consent dismissal must
have been on the merits in traditional res judicata terms is applicable to all actions, including workers' compensation suits.
The court's message to the practitioner is unmistakable.
When an action is dismissed by consent because of a settlement,
the fact of settlement must be reflected in the record. If it is not
feasible to file the written agreement with the court, the order of
dismissal should at least reflect the fact that a settlement has
been reached. If no settlement or adjustment of rights has been
made, the defendant cannot expect protection from a subsequent suit by the use of the words "with prejudice" in the dismissal order. If the phrase "with prejudice" was ever known as a
chancery court or criminal court of the county where the claim for
compensation is entitled to be made. It shall be the duty of the judge
of the circuit court or of the chancery court or criminal court to whom
any proposed settlement shall be presented for approval under this
law, to examine the same to determine whether the employee is receiving, substantially, the benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Law. . . . Upon such settlement being approved, judgment

shall be rendered thereon by the court and duly entered by the
clerk ....

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, when-

ever there is a dispute between the parties as to whether or not a
claim is compensable or the amount of compensation due, the parties
may settle such matter without regard to whether the employee is receiving substantially the benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Law provided such settlement is approved by a court having

jurisdiction of workers' compensation cases and provided further such
settlement is found by the court to be for the best interest of the
employee.
79. 596 S.W.2d at 811.
80.

TENN.

CODE ANN. § 50-1006 (Supp. 1980).
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shorthand way to indicate that a suit had been settled, it can no
longer be accorded that status.
The implication of the court's holding in Garrett is that a
plaintiff will not be allowed to relinquish voluntarily his cause of
action without a settlement or some adjustment of rights between the parties; that is, a plaintiff cannot defeat his own right
to an adjudication on the merits. This is the policy embodied
with certain limitations in Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of
Civil Procedure$' regarding voluntary dismissals; a dismissal
should not have a greater effect because the plaintiff has secured
the defendant's consent to the dismissal. Although arguments of
judicial economy might be made for automatically equating a
consent dismissal or a dismissal with prejudice with an adjudication on the merits which will bar a subsequent suit, the competing interest in justice is better served by not according any such
talismanic quality to a particular form or to particular words.
Likewise, an inference of settlement should not be drawn from
the consensual nature of a dismissal, which may have resulted
from social or economic pressures.2 Adherence to traditional notions of res judicata requires that evidence of a settlement or of
some adjustment of rights be shown before the prior dismissal
will constitute a bar. If there has been a settlement, such a
showing would not be burdensome.
In Garrett v. Corry Foam Products,Inc. the Tennessee Supreme Court clearly announced its intention to apply traditional
notions of res judicata in determining whether a prior dismissal
will bar a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same
cause of action. Neither the consensual nature of a dismissal nor
its use of the words "with prejudice" is evidence of an adjudication on the merits. The court made clear that either the order of
dismissal itself or the record in the previous action must show
an actual settlement or adjustment of rights between the parties.
81. See note 56 supra.
82. That such pressures might force a dismissal is especially true when,
as in the principal case, there is an employer-employee relationship. The employee's fear of possible future reprisals by the employer, coupled with the inherent inequality of bargaining power between the employer and the employee,
conceivably could influence the employee to agree to a consent dismissal with
prejudice. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (Desk ed. 1980).
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In Garrett the court demonstrated both a salutary regard for assuring justice through procedural safeguards and an admirable
determination not to sacrifice the interest in a just resolution of
conflicts to the interest in finality.
JUDY MAE Corr

